ARCOM

Search or browse again.

Click on the titles below to expand the information about each abstract.
Viewing 18 results ...

Cardin, M-A (2011) Quantitative performance-based evaluation of a procedure for flexible design concept generation, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Chiang, R (2002) Agency and incentive contract in private investment of transport project: An exploration of fundamental relationships, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

• Type: Thesis
• Keywords: competition; uncertainty; insurance; diversification; government; incentive contract; investment; regulation
• ISBN/ISSN:
• URL: https://www.proquest.com/docview/305491082
• Abstract:
  This thesis codifies and relates critical incentive-design and financial-contracting issue to the unique principal-agent circumstances generated from private investment of transport infrastructure and provides a framework for designing incentive contract and increasing future economic efficiency gains (or minimizing loses). In the mathematical form, we uniquely integrated multitask agency and common agency into our modeling. The outcome could be simplified as: the equilibrium with n principals is exactly as if there is just one hypothetical principal with an objective function that is the sum of all the separate principals' objectives, but the agent's risk aversion is multiplied n-fold. Remember that the more risk averse the agent, the lower the power of the incentive scheme. Thus, the Nash equilibrium incentive scheme with n principals has, roughly speaking, only (1/n)-th the power of the second-best scheme that would be offered by one truly unified principal. With promotion of incentive competition among the Government and the Board the incentives can be more powerful than those in the second-best. The reason is that each must now use a positive coefficient on the component of output that is of direct concern to him in order to divert the CEO from tasks that benefit the other. This competition among the Government and the Board leads them to raise those coefficients to higher levels. The most important predictions of the theoretical model are as follows. First, when transport service consumers view the output of tasks as complementary, CEOs should be given lower-powered incentives from the Board and higher-powered incentives from the Government. For government, to encourage efforts allocated to primary transport service, less complementary second activity should be discouraged. Second, when uncertainty across tasks is highly correlated, CEOs should also be given lower powered incentives. Indeed, a positive relationship increases the CEO's risk and therefore her need for insurance. A negative relationship, in contrast, is a source of risk diversification. From incentive regulation perspective, higher-powered incentive should be given when the relationship is positive and lower when it is negative. All of these predictions are confirmed by the empirical data. (Copies available exclusively from MIT Libraries, Rm. 14-0551, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Ph. 617-253-5668; Fax 617-253-1690.)

Garvin, M J (2001) Strategic indicators for characterization of water system infrastructure and management, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kristinsdottir, A (2012) Risks and decision making in development of new power plant projects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kua, H W (2006) The design of effective policies for the promotion of sustainable construction materials, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Lee, S (2006) Dynamic planning and control methodology: Understanding and managing iterative error and change cycles in large-scale concurrent design and construction projects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Miller, J B (1995) Aligning infrastructure development strategy to meet current public needs, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Minelli, P (2020) Improved methods for managing megaprojects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Moret, Y (2011) Modeling cost and time uncertainty in rail line construction, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Park, M (2001) Dynamic planning and control methodology for large-scale concurrent construction projects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Slaughter, E S (1991) Rapid innovation and integration of components: Comparison of user and manufacturer innovations through a study of residential construction, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Sousa, R L (2010) Risk analysis for tunneling projects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Taylor, D D J (2018) Tools for managing intermittent water supplies, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Tsai, I T (2007) Default and renegotiation: Financial structure and incentive in public-private partnership contracts, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Viteri, V R (2003) Experiential learning environments for structural behavior, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Wang, M-T (1989) Knowledge processing for a construction management database, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Wooldridge, S C (2002) Balancing capital and condition: An emerging approach to facility investment strategy, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Yan, S (1992) Intermodal pricing and operations using network flow techniques, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Massachusetts Institute of Technology.